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It has long been recognized that issues affecting the entire nation require uniform and connected
solutions. There are several reasons why child custody litigation is a national issue. First, Americans
live in a mobile society where jobs often require families to relocate to another state. Moreover, a
large number of children are born outside of marriage. n1 Finally, one out of every two marriages
ends in divorce. n2 A large number of divorces involve children. n3 For these and other reasons,
parents commonly reside in different states while sharing custody of their children.
Interstate custody arrangements raise the following policy questions:
(1) Should more than one state have jurisdiction to decide where the children live?
(2) Should one state be allowed to ignore the other states' custody determination?
 [*302]  (3) Should states have discretion in means of enforcing other states' child custody
orders?
The answer to these questions should be "no." There should be only one state that has
jurisdiction to issue a child custody determination; states should be forced to honor other states'
properly issued child custody orders; and states should engage in uniform practices of enforcement.
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) has attempted to
address these issues through two acts: the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) and
the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). While both Acts have
similar objectives, the UCCJEA provides more guidance to states to ensure the achievement of the
Act's objectives. The Oregon legislature adopted the UCCJA in 1973 but then replaced it with the
UCCJEA in its 1999 legislative session.
This Comment will explain the major provisions of the UCCJA and how the UCCJEA modifies
them. Part I will provide a detailed explanation of the UCCJA's jurisdiction and enforcement
provisions and will discuss how those provisions have been interpreted by Oregon courts. Part II
will then discuss how the UCCJEA builds on and changes the UCCJA and the impact these changes
will have on current Oregon child custody law. This Comment concludes by recommending that
other states follow Oregon's lead by replacing their version of the UCCJA with the UCCJEA.
I
 UCCJA
 The NCCUSL created the UCCJA in 1968 to address some of the problems existing in child
custody litigation. Specifically, the UCCJA sought to decrease competition among states for
jurisdiction; ensure that child custody litigation took place in the state with the best access to
evidence; deter parental kidnappings; prevent child custody disputes from being re-litigated in
another state; promote interstate enforcement of child custody determinations; and provide a
uniform framework for determining child custody jurisdiction. n4 Every state, including Oregon,
adopted  [*303]  some version of the UCCJA. n5
The UCCJA addresses the following four major areas: (1) what proceedings are covered by the
UCCJA; (2) which state has initial jurisdiction to hear a child custody dispute; (3) when a state may
modify another state's child custody determination; and (4) when a state must enforce another state's
determination. n6 The remainder of Part I will take up each of these areas and fully discuss them.
A. Scope of the UCCJA
 The UCCJA governs the determination of jurisdiction for custody proceedings. Thus, the threshold
issue to be determined is whether the dispute is a custody proceeding. "Custody proceedings" are
defined vaguely as "proceedings in which a custody determination is one of several issues, such as
an action for divorce or separation, and includes child neglect and dependency proceedings." n7
Even though the UCCJA does not explicitly cover them, Oregon appellate courts have also
characterized adoption and guardianship proceedings as custody proceedings. n8 Since the
definition of "custody proceeding" is ambiguous, states do not have uniform understandings of what
actions constitute custody proceedings. This lack of clarity has led to patchwork applications of the
UCCJA. n9
If a dispute is considered a custody proceeding, the UCCJA's jurisdictional and enforcement
provisions govern. If the proceeding  [*304]  is an original suit, the UCCJA's provisions on initial
jurisdiction determine whether a state may adjudicate the custody proceeding.
B. Initial Jurisdiction
 As stated above, the UCCJA addresses when states have initial subject matter jurisdiction over
custody proceedings. To establish initial jurisdiction, a state must meet the requirements of one of
the four forms of initial jurisdiction; n10 grounds must not exist for the state to decline jurisdiction;
n11 and there must not be parallel proceedings occurring in another state with proper jurisdiction
under the UCCJA. n12
1. Bases for Initial Jurisdiction
 A state's first inquiry with original custody proceedings is whether the state can establish one of the
forms of initial jurisdiction. n13 The UCCJA provides four situations where a state has initial
jurisdiction: (1) home state jurisdiction; (2) significant connection jurisdiction; (3) emergency
jurisdiction; and (4) default jurisdiction. n14 If a state can merely satisfy one of these four forms, it
may take jurisdiction since the UCCJA does not prioritize the bases of initial jurisdiction.
a. Home State
 The UCCJA defines "home state" as "the state in which the child ... lived with [at least one] parent,
or a person acting as parent, for at least six consecutive months" prior to the filing of the
proceeding. n15 Generally, a state has home state jurisdiction if it was the child's home state when
the proceeding was commenced. n16  [*305]  Additionally, even if the child no longer lives in the
state, the state may still have home state jurisdiction if the following conditions are met: (1) the
state was the child's home state within six months prior to the commencement of the proceeding; (2)
the child was removed from the state by a person claiming custody or for other reasons; and (3) one
of the child's parents, or a person acting as the child's parent, continues to reside in the state. n17
b. Significant Connection
 The second form of initial jurisdiction under the UCCJA is significant connection jurisdiction. A
state has significant connection jurisdiction when it is in the child's best interests because the child
and at least one parent have a "significant connection with this state, and there is available in this
state substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future care, protection, training, and
personal relationships." n18 In Oregon, whether a state has significant connection jurisdiction has
been a hotly litigated issue, particularly where another state was the child's home state. n19
In addressing situations involving a home state and a significant connection state, Oregon courts
have made it clear that the UCCJA contemplates concurrent jurisdiction. n20 Thus, if a state meets
the requirements of significant connection jurisdiction, it has jurisdiction even though there is a
home state. Once it is determined that more than one state has jurisdiction, the UCCJA's provisions




 Even if a state lacks home state or significant connection jurisdiction, the UCCJA allows for courts
to exercise jurisdiction in emergency situations. Emergency jurisdiction exists if "the child is
physically present in [a] state and the child has been abandoned or it is necessary in an emergency
to protect the child because the child has been subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse
or is otherwise neglected or dependent." n22
As read, the statute seems to allow states to have jurisdiction so long as the child is within its
borders. However, this interpretation is contrary to the UCCJA's general purposes as well as the
NCCUSL's intent in providing for emergency jurisdiction. n23 The UCCJA was drafted to
discourage jurisdictional competition and promote cooperation among courts. n24 Moreover, the
comment to the emergency jurisdiction provision emphasizes that while physical presence is the
only prerequisite for a state to exercise emergency jurisdiction, this provision should be construed
as an "extraordinary [form of] jurisdiction [that] is reserved for extraordinary circumstances." n25
d. Default
 The final form of jurisdiction, default jurisdiction, applies to very limited situations. A state has this
kind of jurisdiction when no other state has jurisdiction under the other three provisions or other
states have declined to exercise their jurisdiction. n26 Because it applies to such a narrow fact
pattern, this form of jurisdiction has not been an issue for Oregon courts to address.
Evaluating whether a state meets one of the four bases of initial jurisdiction is only the first step
in deciding whether a state should render a custody determination. As noted earlier, once a state
establishes initial jurisdiction, it must then determine whether it should decline jurisdiction. n27
 [*307]
2. Declining Jurisdiction
 Since the UCCJA does not prioritize the bases for jurisdiction, it is possible for multiple states to
have jurisdiction over a custody proceeding. In order to curtail states from exercising concurrent
jurisdiction over a child custody dispute, the UCCJA authorizes states to decline jurisdiction when a
more convenient forum exists or when the party seeking the state to take jurisdiction engaged in
wrongful conduct. n28
First, a court may decline jurisdiction when it is an inconvenient forum and another state is a
more appropriate forum. The UCCJA lists several factors for determining whether it is more
appropriate for the other state to hear the custody dispute. These factors attempt to ascertain which
state would be a better spot to litigate and include: whether the state was or is the child's home state;
whether the state has substantial evidence regarding the child's well-being; whether the state has a
closer connection to the child and the family or other parties to the proceeding; and other practical
considerations. n29
Additionally, a state may decline initial jurisdiction if the petitioner wrongfully brought the
child into the state for an initial decree. n30 The wrongful conduct provision in the UCCJA exposes
the conflict between placing jurisdiction in states with the best  [*308]  access to the relevant
evidence and discouraging parents from abducting their children. n31 The comment following this
provision attempts to reconcile these competing interests by encouraging states with jurisdiction to
decline to hear a dispute where "one party's conduct is so objectionable that a court in the exercise
of its inherent equity powers cannot in good conscience permit that party access to its jurisdiction."
n32 Thus, while it vests authority in states to decline jurisdiction, the UCCJA affords states much
discretion in deciding whether a party's conduct was so egregious to warrant declining jurisdiction.
Over the years, problems have become apparent with the UCCJA's approach for limiting initial
jurisdiction to the most appropriate state. First, it is possible for states to exercise concurrent
jurisdiction over a child custody dispute since the UCCJA does not prioritize its four jurisdictional
bases. n33 While the UCCJA's provisions on inconvenient forum and wrongful conduct are
intended to narrow jurisdiction to one state, n34 these provisions have not always succeeded in
making sure that only one state assumes initial jurisdiction. n35 Additionally, the UCCJA allows a
state to dismiss its proceedings if it determines that another state is a more convenient forum or that
the petitioner engaged in wrongful conduct. However, this provision grants states a lot of discretion
in evaluating whether a party's conduct was so egregious to warrant declining jurisdiction.
Moreover, if a state declines jurisdiction and proceedings have not been commenced in the more
appropriate state, a custody dispute may languish unresolved. n36
3. Parallel Proceedings
 The final consideration concerning initial jurisdiction addresses parallel proceedings filed in two
states that have each established one of the four bases of initial jurisdiction. Basically, the UCCJA
provides that a state must stay its proceedings if there is a child  [*309]  custody case already
pending in another state that has exercised jurisdiction consistent with the UCCJA. n37
As the foregoing sections discuss, a state has proper initial jurisdiction if it determines that it has
initial subject matter jurisdiction, that grounds do not exist for declining jurisdiction, and that there
are no parallel proceedings. In addition to initial petitions, jurisdictional issues also arise with pre-
existing child custody orders. The next two sections will evaluate the circumstances under which a
state has jurisdiction to modify another state's pre-existing custody order and those under which a
state must enforce another state's order.
C. Modification Jurisdiction
 The UCCJA limits the circumstances under which a state can exercise jurisdiction to modify
another state's custody order. In order to have modification jurisdiction, a state must establish that
they have one of the jurisdictional forms discussed under initial jurisdiction, and that the issuing
state either does not continue to have jurisdiction under provisions similar to the UCCJA or has
declined to exercise jurisdiction. n38 It is the obligation of the state seeking jurisdiction to
determine whether the issuing state retains jurisdiction. Whether the issuing state retains jurisdiction
is often difficult to determine because the UCCJA provides four alternative bases for establishing
jurisdiction.
Modification jurisdiction is particularly difficult to establish where it could be argued that the
issuing state still has significant connection jurisdiction. For example, a state may have issued a
decree when it was the child's home state. Even if the child no longer resides in the issuing state, the
issuing state may still have significant connection jurisdiction over the child. Oregon's leading case
on modification jurisdiction is Grubs v. Ross. n39 The court in Grubs explained that the UCCJA
should be construed in favor of the issuing state. n40 Accordingly, even where another state may
have become the child's home state, the new home state should look closely to see if the issuing
state still has significant  [*310]  connection jurisdiction. n41
However, the UCCJA, while mandating that a state should evaluate the issuing state's
jurisdictional ties to the dispute, does not provide any guidance for determining whether jurisdiction
has lapsed. This creates the potential for simultaneous proceedings and conflicting custody orders
since "one [state could] improperly exercise jurisdiction because it erroneously believes that the
other [state] has declined jurisdiction." n42
As explained above, modification jurisdiction is limited to those situations where the issuing
state has relinquished its jurisdiction and the new state can establish one of the four forms of
jurisdiction. In addition, the UCCJA defines both when jurisdiction to render or modify a child
custody award exists, and when states are required to enforce another state's child custody order.
D. Enforcement
 Under the UCCJA, a state has an obligation to enforce another state's custody order where the other
state exercised jurisdiction consistent with the UCCJA. Conversely, if the state's exercise of
jurisdiction does not conform with the UCCJA, other states are not required to enforce its order. n43
While it creates a duty to enforce other states' custody determinations, the UCCJA does not
provide mechanisms for enforcement. n44 To fill this void, states have crafted their own
enforcement remedies. The Act's goal of promoting interstate enforcement is frustrated in several
respects by states having their own enforcement schemes. For example, the costs of enforcement are
increased, the certainty of outcome is lessened, and procuring enforcement can become a long,
drawn out process. n45
 [*311]
E. The Transition from the UCCJA to the UCCJEA
 The UCCJA was drafted thirty years ago to provide states with a framework for resolving
jurisdictional questions that could arise in child custody disputes. Oregon adopted the UCCJA in
1973. The Act supplies guidelines for determining initial subject matter jurisdiction, for establishing
modification jurisdiction, and for determining when child custody orders should be enforced.
However, as discussed, the UCCJA is not perfect, and its purposes have not been fully realized due
to the ambiguities within the Act.
The UCCJEA was drafted in 1997 to update the UCCJA's provisions and to address the
problems with the UCCJA. Part II will explore how the UCCJEA builds on and improves the
UCCJA's provisions on initial jurisdiction, modification, and enforcement.
II
 UCCJEA
 During its 1999 session, the Oregon legislature adopted the UCCJEA to replace the UCCJA. n46
The UCCJEA's major provisions are scope, initial jurisdiction, exclusive and continuing
jurisdiction, modification jurisdiction, emergency jurisdiction, and enforcement. How these
provisions build on and depart from the UCCJA will be the focus of Part II of this Comment.
A. Scope of UCCJEA
 The UCCJEA, like the UCCJA, applies to and enforces child custody proceedings and child
custody determinations. As noted earlier, problems exist with the UCCJA's definition of "custody
proceeding". n47 With this in mind, the drafters of the UCCJEA defined "child custody
proceedings" and "child custody determinations" with greater specificity to provide guidance in
determining to which child custody actions the UCCJEA applies.
1. Child Custody Proceedings
 First, the UCCJEA defines "child custody proceedings" to include  [*312]  virtually any cause of
action where a determination of custody is required. n48 Under the UCCJEA, "child custody
proceedings" are "proceedings in which legal custody, physical custody, or visitation with respect to
a child is an issue ... including proceedings for divorce, separation, neglect, abuse, dependency,
guardianship, paternity, termination of parental rights, and protection from domestic violence, in
which the issue may appear." n49 However, proceedings involving juvenile delinquency,
emancipation, or the UCCJEA's enforcement provisions are not child custody proceedings for the
purposes of this Act. n50 Oregon's definition of child custody proceedings follows the UCCJEA's,
except Oregon includes parenting time proceedings as child custody proceedings, n51 and Oregon
continues to include adoptions as child custody proceedings. n52
The UCCJEA builds on the UCCJA's definition of child custody proceedings in two respects.
First, the UCCJEA's definition mandates that proceedings for divorce, separation, neglect, and
dependency are child custody proceedings, while the UCCJA only provides that a child custody
proceeding may include divorce or separation actions. Second, the UCCJEA expands the scope of
acts that are included under child custody proceedings by classifying proceedings for abuse,
guardianship, paternity, termination of parental rights, and domestic violence as child custody
proceedings. n53 The net result of these changes to the UCCJA's definition is to "include[ ] virtually
all cases that can involve custody of or visitation with a child" and to redefine what types of cases
are subject to the UCCJEA. n54
2. Child Custody Determinations
 The UCCJEA defines "child custody determinations" expansively as "a judgment, decree, or other
order of a court providing  [*313]  for the legal custody, physical custody, or visitation with respect
to a child ... including permanent, temporary, initial, and modification orders." n55 The Act
excludes orders pertaining to monetary obligations, such as child support. n56 Oregon adopted this
definition verbatim and added that orders concerning parenting time are also child custody
determinations. n57 The UCCJEA's definition alters the UCCJA's by clarifying that actions for both
legal and physical custody are included as well as specifying that the determination may be a
temporary, initial, or modification order. n58
In composing the definitions for child custody proceedings and child custody determinations,
the UCCJEA's drafters sought to provide more instruction than the UCCJA regarding what actions
are governed by the Act. To this end, both definitions provide specific instances included under the
UCCJEA. Oregon, by adopting the definitions with few alterations, can anticipate that more child
custody actions will be within the purview of the UCCJEA. In addition to revamping the UCCJA's
definitions of child custody determinations and proceedings, the UCCJEA drafters made substantial
changes to the UCCJA's provisions on establishing initial jurisdiction, on continuing and
modification jurisdiction, and on enforcement.
B. Bases for Initial Jurisdiction
 The UCCJEA lists four ways for a state to establish initial jurisdiction: (1) home state jurisdiction;
(2) significant connection jurisdiction; (3) more appropriate forum jurisdiction; and (4) necessity
jurisdiction. n59 This framework departs from the UCCJA in two respects. First, emergency
jurisdiction has been moved to another section of the Act and replaced by more appropriate forum
jurisdiction. n60 Second, it attaches an order of priority to the  [*314]  different forms of
jurisdiction. n61 By ranking the avenues to establish jurisdiction, the UCCJEA allows for only one
state to have initial jurisdiction over a child custody dispute. n62 In other words, a state that has
home state jurisdiction supercedes any state with significant connection, more appropriate forum, or
necessity jurisdiction. Moreover, once a state establishes jurisdiction, any subsequent proceedings
started in another state with a lower form of jurisdiction may not continue. n63
1. Home State
 The UCCJEA provides that a court has original jurisdiction to hear an initial child custody
determination where the state is the child's home state, or was the child's home state within six
months prior to the commencement of the child custody action, and a parent, or person acting as a
parent, continues to live in the state. n64 "Home state" is defined in the UCCJEA as the state in
which the child lived for six consecutive months prior to the commencement of the child custody
proceeding. n65
As noted above, the UCCJEA departs from the UCCJA by prioritizing "home state jurisdiction"
as the strongest form of jurisdiction to hear a child custody dispute. The effect of prioritizing the
home state is to make it clear that if the child's home state assumes jurisdiction, no other state, even
if it meets the jurisdictional requirements of one of the remaining three provisions, has jurisdiction.
The second strongest form of original jurisdiction is significant connection.
2. Significant Connection
 When there is no home state or the home state has declined jurisdiction, the UCCJEA allows
another state to establish jurisdiction over the matter by showing that the child has a significant
[*315]  connection with the state. A state has significant connection jurisdiction if the child and at
least one parent (or person acting as a parent) has a significant connection to the state beyond
physical presence and there is substantial evidence within the state "concerning the child's care,
protection, training and personal relationships." n66
Since Oregon adopted the UCCJEA's definition verbatim, Oregon's new approach for
determining significant connection jurisdiction departs from the old approach in three respects.
First, courts are no longer required to determine whether it is in the child's best interests for the state
to assume jurisdiction. n67 Second, significant connection jurisdiction now may only be established
when there is no home state or the home state has declined jurisdiction over the matter. Third, the
statutory language on evidence concerning the child's "present or future care" has been eliminated.
Overall, the changes to the provisions are not significant and analyzing significant connection
jurisdiction under the UCCJEA requires consideration of the same factors as under the UCCJA. n68
Because significant connection is based upon evidence concerning the child and does not
require that the child reside in the state, it is possible for multiple states to have jurisdiction. This
can arise when there is a state with home state jurisdiction and another with significant connection
jurisdiction, or when two states have significant connection jurisdiction.
Where there is a home state and a significant connection state, the home state has priority over
the significant connection state. n69 If a state wants to exercise significant connection jurisdiction,
it must first determine if the child has a home state. If there is a home state, the home state must
decline jurisdiction before the significant connection state can assume jurisdiction. n70 This
approach supercedes Oregon judicial interpretations under  [*316]  the UCCJA that allow states to
have concurrent jurisdiction. n71
Additionally, there may be situations where multiple states have significant connections with the
child and at least one parent. In these situations, both the UCCJEA and Oregon keep the UCCJA's
rule that the state where the first proceeding was filed has jurisdiction. n72 Also, the UCCJEA
retains the UCCJA's requirement that the states vying for jurisdiction communicate with each other
until jurisdiction is resolved. n73
While home state and significant connection jurisdiction seem to exhaust all jurisdictional
possibilities, the UCCJEA allows for states with either form of jurisdiction to defer to another state
as the more appropriate forum.
3. More Appropriate Forum
 Another state may have jurisdiction as the more appropriate forum where a state with either home
state or significant connection jurisdiction declines jurisdiction. There are two grounds for denial of
jurisdiction: (1) another state is a more convenient forum, and (2) one of the parties engaged in
unjustifiable conduct. n74 Should the court decide that another state is a more appropriate forum,
that state should stay its proceedings and the more appropriate forum state should hear the custody
dispute.
a. Inconvenient Forum
 In determining whether a state is an inconvenient forum to hear a dispute, a state that has home
state or significant connection jurisdiction should consider the following several factors: whether
domestic violence or the potential for it exists and which state is in the best position to protect the
child and the parties; the length of time the child has been outside of the state; the distance between
the two courts vying for jurisdiction; the parties' relative financial situations; whether any agreement
exists between the parties as to which state should assume jurisdiction; the location of relevant
evidence; the two courts' relative abilities to resolve the matter expeditiously; and the two courts'
relative  [*317]  familiarity with the facts and issues present in the custody dispute. n75 If the court
determines that another state is a more convenient forum, the court should stay its proceedings, and
the other state should begin to process the child custody dispute.
The UCCJEA's approach to inconvenient forum departs from the UCCJA by adding two new
factors to consider and changing the method of disposing of a case when an inconvenient forum is
found. The UCCJEA allows states to consider domestic violence and to determine which state is in
a better position to protect against it. n76 Courts should also consider their respective dockets and
laws on procedure and evidence in determining which state is better suited to hear the custody
dispute. n77 Finally, the UCCJEA requires that the state stay its action. This is also a change from
the UCCJA which mandates that states dismiss their action upon a finding of inconvenient forum.
n78
b. Wrongful Conduct
 A second reason for states to decline jurisdiction is because of the conduct of the one of the parties.
Under the UCCJEA, a state must decline jurisdiction if the person requesting the state to exercise
jurisdiction engaged in wrongful conduct in order to invoke jurisdiction. If the court decides to
defer jurisdiction because of unjustifiable conduct, the court must stay its proceedings and may
assess costs against the party who sought to invoke jurisdiction. n79
The "unclean hands" provision is included in the UCCJA and is retained by the UCCJEA to
ensure that parents who abduct their children do not profit from their conduct. n80 Under this
provision, when parents abduct their children prior to obtaining a child custody award, establish a
new home state, and initiate custody proceedings, that state is not permitted to take jurisdiction. n81
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4. Necessity
 Necessity jurisdiction provides for a state to take jurisdiction where no other state is willing or able
to. n82 This approach was contained in the UCCJA and has not been substantially changed in the
UCCJEA. n83 As stated earlier, this section would only apply to extreme situations, if at all. n84
As the preceding sections discuss, the UCCJEA places initial jurisdiction with the state with
either home state jurisdiction or the next highest form of jurisdiction. Once it establishes initial
jurisdiction, that state may adjudicate the child custody dispute. However, court supervision may
still be required even after the dispute is adjudicated. For this reason, the UCCJEA also addresses
when a state's initial jurisdiction continues, and when states are able to modify other states' child
custody orders.
C. Exclusive, Continuing Jurisdiction and Modification Jurisdiction
 Once a state establishes that it has original jurisdiction, two issues are raised: (1) when that state's
initial jurisdiction lapses, and (2) under what circumstances another state may modify the original
state's child custody award. The UCCJEA addresses both of these jurisdictional issues.
1. Continuing, Exclusive Jurisdiction
 The UCCJA does not contain a provision dealing with states' continuing jurisdiction; this provision
was included in the UCCJEA to clarify when a state's jurisdiction continued. n85 Under the
UCCJEA, a decree state retains exclusive jurisdiction unless (1) the decree state determines that the
child and at least one parent no longer have a significant connection with the state and the state no
longer has substantial evidence concerning the child, or (2) it is determined by the decree state or
another state that all of the parties to the custody dispute have moved away  [*319]  from the state.
n86
Prior to the enactment of the UCCJEA, the Oregon Supreme Court arrived at the same
conclusion in In re Henry. n87 In that case, California had issued the initial child custody order but
Oregon subsequently became the child's home state. The court had to decide whether California had
continuing jurisdiction over the child custody dispute. The court held that so long as California still
had jurisdiction based on its own laws and had not declined jurisdiction, Oregon did not have
jurisdiction to modify California's child custody order. n88 Thus, in adopting the UCCJEA, the
Oregon legislature has embraced the approach already followed by the state's judiciary.
In addition to setting out when a state retains exclusive and continuous jurisdiction, the
UCCJEA also identifies the circumstances under which a state may modify another state's child
custody order.
2. Modification Jurisdiction
 The UCCJEA limits a state's jurisdiction to modify to situations where either the issuing state has
determined that it no longer has jurisdiction, or the court of the issuing state (or court of the
modification state) determine that all the parties have moved out of the issuing state. These are the
only two situations that allow another state to modify a child custody order. Additionally, the state
seeking to modify must have home state or significant connection jurisdiction. n89
In defining modification jurisdiction, the UCCJEA changes the UCCJA's provision on
modification to complement the UCCJEA's provision on continuing and exclusive jurisdiction.
Under the UCCJA, it is considered the responsibility of the state seeking to modify to determine
whether or not the issuing state retains jurisdiction. n90 Now under the UCCJEA, the issuing state
decides whether it still has jurisdiction. This approach is consistent with the UCCJEA's provision on
continuing and exclusive  [*320]  jurisdiction which also specifies that it is the issuing state's
obligation to determine whether or not it retains jurisdiction. n91 Moreover, the only way the
modifying state can establish that the issuing state lost jurisdiction is by determining that all the
parties moved away from the issuing state. n92
Since the UCCJEA requires the issuing state to determine whether it retains jurisdiction, Grubs
v. Ross n93 is no longer controlling. In Grubs, the Oregon Supreme Court explained that in
determining the existence of modification jurisdiction, courts must decide whether the original state
has jurisdiction under standards that are substantially similar to the UCCJA's. n94 This approach is
contrary to the UCCJEA since the UCCJEA makes it clear that the issuing state gets to decide
whether it still has jurisdiction.
D. Temporary Emergency Jurisdiction
 The final jurisdictional component of the UCCJEA directs when states may take temporary
emergency jurisdiction and issue temporary orders. Under the UCCJEA, a state may gain temporary
jurisdiction in specific emergency situations regardless of whether or not a custody order from
another state exists. In order for a state to have emergency jurisdiction, the child must be present in
the state, and the child must have been abandoned or "the child, or a sibling or parent of the child,
[was] subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse." n95
If a state determines it has emergency jurisdiction and there is no previous custody
determination in another state, the state may issue a temporary order. The order shall remain in
effect  [*321]  until a court that has initial, modification, or continuing jurisdiction issues a custody
order. If there is a state that already has jurisdiction over the custody dispute, any order issued by
the emergency jurisdiction state must specify the length of time that the court considers adequate for
a party to get an order from the state with jurisdiction. Additionally, the emergency jurisdiction
court must communicate with the court of the state having jurisdiction. The two courts must work
together to resolve the emergency, protect the parties, and determine the length of time that the
temporary order will be effective. n96
The emergency jurisdiction element retains most of the language from the UCCJA as well as its
original intent. Emergency jurisdiction is still intended to be a last resort in "extraordinary
situations." n97 However, some changes were made to emphasize the temporary nature of orders
issued under emergency jurisdiction. n98 First, it was removed from the initial jurisdiction section.
Second, the statute provides that any orders issued under emergency jurisdiction are temporary. n99
The final major provision of the UCCJEA addresses when and how states must enforce other states'
child custody determinations.
E. Enforcement
 In its enforcement provision, the UCCJEA creates a duty to enforce as well as remedies for
enforcement of custody determinations. The duty to enforce provision was taken from the UCCJA,
n100 while the enforcement remedies were newly created by the UCCJEA's drafters, recognizing
that more effective enforcement of orders was required.
1. Duty to Enforce
 Basically, the UCCJEA requires that a state enforce a child custody determination that another state
decided pursuant to standards similar to those of the enforcing state. n101 Moreover, a  [*322]  state
is not required to enforce a child custody determination where the issuing state's exercise of
jurisdiction does not comport with the UCCJEA. n102
Since the UCCJEA's definition of child custody determination is broader than the UCCJA's,
n103 more child custody orders are required to be enforced by the UCCJEA. The duty to enforce
provision also authorizes the state to utilize any remedies provided under the UCCJEA as well as
the state's other laws. n104
2. Remedies for Enforcement of Custody Determination
 As noted above, the UCCJEA provides remedies for interstate enforcement of child custody orders.
Under the UCCJA, states are left to craft their own remedies, since the UCCJA does not address
enforcement remedies. The lack of uniformity among the states complicates the enforcement
process in several respects. n105 To provide greater uniformity and simplify the enforcement
process, the UCCJEA provides for the following remedies: (1) temporary visitation orders; (2)
registration of child custody determinations; (3) expedited enforcement of the determination; (4)
production of the child; and (5) authorization of public officials to assist in enforcing child custody
determinations. n106
a. Temporary Emergency Order
 The first remedy under the UCCJEA authorizes a court to issue a temporary order in situations
where it is necessary to enforce  [*323]  visitation or parenting time provisions in a child custody
order. If a court enters a temporary emergency order, it must specify in the order the length of time
it considers sufficient for a party to get an order from the state with jurisdiction. This remedy allows
for courts to enforce a child custody order even where they do not have jurisdiction to modify the
order. n107
b. Registration of Child Custody Determinations
 The second remedy available is to register a child custody determination. To register a
determination, all that is required is a letter requesting registration, two copies (including one
certified copy) of the document to be registered, a sworn statement that the determination has not
been changed, and the names and addresses of the parties who have custody under the order as well
as the person who is seeking registration. n108
While the UCCJA also provides a mechanism for registering a child custody order, the process
has been simplified under the UCCJEA. The registration process is so simple that an attorney isn't
required, and it can be accompanied by a request for enforcement. n109 Additionally, registration
ensures future enforcement because a determination may simply be registered without an
accompanying request that it be enforced. n110
A state that registers a child custody order may enforce the order as if it was granted by that
state. However, the registered order remains a custody determination by the issuing state and may
not be modified unless the state where the order was registered has jurisdiction to modify under the
UCCJEA. n111
c. Expedited Enforcement of a Child Custody Determination
 The third enforcement mechanism provided in the UCCJEA involves the production of the child
via a process akin to habeas corpus. To initiate this remedy, a petitioner must first file a petition for
enforcement with the court and state the jurisdictional basis the issuing court relied on; second,
provide whether the order has been vacated, modified, or stayed by a court with continuing  [*324]
jurisdiction; n112 third, identify any pending proceedings that could affect the current enforcement
proceeding; fourth, provide the child and respondent's present physical address; fifth, specify
whether any additional relief beyond attorney fees and physical custody of the child is being
requested; and finally, state whether the child custody determination has been registered and
confirmed under the UCCJEA. n113
Upon the filing of a petition, a court must issue an order directing the respondent to appear in
person at a specified date and time and advising the respondent that the court may issue an order
granting physical custody to the petitioner. The order must be served upon the respondent.
At the hearing, the court must award physical custody to the petitioner unless the respondent
establishes one of two defects in the enforcement process. First, enforcement will be denied if the
respondent establishes that the court that issued the order lacked jurisdiction under the UCCJEA;
that the child custody determination that petitioner is seeking to have enforced has been vacated,
stayed, or modified by a court with proper jurisdiction under the UCCJEA; or that respondent was
not given proper notice of the enforcement proceeding. Additionally, if the order has been properly
registered, the only way the respondent might bar enforcement is to establish that the child custody
determination has been vacated, stayed, or modified by a court with proper jurisdiction under the
UCCJEA. n114
Habeas corpus-type proceedings have been the traditional remedy for child custody
enforcement. The UCCJEA drafters, in codifying this approach, intended to ensure that habeas
corpus remains the primary enforcement remedy that states utilize. n115 The drafters also intended
the proceedings to be an "extremely expeditious remedy." n116 The only change which Oregon
makes to the UCCJEA's approach is to insist that the enforcement hearing take place "as soon as
reasonably possible." The UCCJEA directs courts to hold the hearing "on the next judicial  [*325]
day" following the service of the order. n117
d. Production of Child
 The UCCJEA also authorizes that where the child is in imminent danger of being harmed or
removed from the state, the state may issue a warrant to take physical custody of the child. n118 In
order for the state to take possession of the child, a party must file a petition with the court alleging
the child is in danger, and the court must determine, based upon petitioner's and other witnesses'
testimony, that there is probable cause that the child is at risk of serious physical harm. Any
warrants issued must recite the reasons the court determined the child was in danger, authorize law
enforcement officials to immediately take the child into physical custody, and place the child
outside the home until the matter is resolved. n119
This remedy is intended to be utilized in emergency situations where the child is at risk of harm.
n120 While the UCCJEA does not define harm, this provision contemplates situations where the
party holding the child has pending criminal proceedings, has kept the child in violation of a child
custody determination, has abused the child, or poses a flight risk. In addition, the court should
consider any other circumstances that would pose a risk of harm to the child. n121
e. Involvement of Public Officials
 The final remedy provided under the UCCJEA allows district attorneys to take actions to locate a
child, return the child to its appropriate custodian, and enforce a child custody order if one of the
following exists: (1) a child custody determination; (2) a request for enforcement by a court hearing
a pending child custody dispute; (3) a reasonable belief that the party with the child  [*326]  has
violated a criminal law; or (4) a reasonable belief the child was taken in violation of the Hague
Convention's provisions on international child abduction. n122 Additionally, prosecutors may
request the assistance of law enforcement officials when acting under this provision. n123
This approach was added to ensure that parties of all income levels have access to enforcement
mechanisms. By involving public officials, people of low income are able to get assistance in
enforcing an order rather than having to incur the high costs of enforcement litigation. n124
Conclusion
 The UCCJA was created thirty years ago out of the recognition that jurisdictional battles in
interstate child custody litigation were a national issue that required uniform standards for the states
to follow. The UCCJA advises states when they have jurisdiction to hear a child custody dispute,
when they have jurisdiction to modify, and when they have to enforce another state's custody order.
All states have adopted some form of the UCCJA.
While the UCCJA's provisions are premised on admirable objectives, the Act does not
adequately address some of the issues raised in child custody litigation. Several problems have
arisen with regard to the Act's provisions on scope, initial jurisdiction, modification jurisdiction, and
enforcement.
In 1997 the UCCJEA was enacted to eliminate the problems in interstate child custody litigation
that still existed. Specifically, the UCCJEA prioritizes the forms of initial jurisdiction, clarifies
when continuing jurisdiction ceases and when a state may assume modification jurisdiction, and
provides enforcement remedies. Oregon, in adopting the UCCJEA, can anticipate that these changes
will enhance the state's existing framework for determining jurisdiction in interstate child custody
litigation. Other states should follow the lead of Oregon and also adopt the UCCJEA to replace their
version of the UCCJA.
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